

Title: A Comparative Evaluation of Aristotle's Theories of the Elements

Thesis: That according to Aristotle's logical criteria the doctrine of the three elements, on the one hand, is universally and necessarily true and the doctrine of the four elements, on the other hand, is only probably true.

Method: To compare the theories with regard to the following questions:

1. What question does Aristotle intend each theory to answer?
2. How does Aristotle arrive at each answer (the set of elements in question)? It will not be considered necessary to classify each of the pertinent arguments found in the texts according to the types of argumentation except to the extent necessary for defending the thesis. That is, an exposition of the type of Aristotelian argumentation is not to be considered a part of the dissertation topic. The answer to this question will, however, include the mode in which Aristotle argues, e.g. demonstratively or dialectically.
3. What seems to be the relative logical status of each theory of elements?

Chapter outline

Introduction: The dissertation topic is seen as an attempt to extend and clarify a task already begun by Aristotelian scholars, most notably and recently in Aristotle's System of the Physical World: A Comparison with his Predecessors by Friedrich Solmsen, who by his distinction between "physical" and "cosmological" studies makes some distinction between those areas of Aristotle's investigation of inanimate nature for which the three elements and the four elements respectively are the first principles. However, such a comparison is incidental to his main aim and consequently not fully completed. The aim of the dissertation is to complete the comparison in terms of the questions listed above.

Chapter One: "The Three Elements: Book One of the Physics"

An analysis of each chapter in the order of its appearance will yield cumulative answers to the questions (1) What question is the theory of the three elements intended to answer? and (2) What mode (or modes) of argumentation is used to reach the answer. The cumulative answers to these questions will form the conclusion of the chapter.

Chapter Two: "The Four Elements: De caelo"

An analysis of selected chapters and topics in some order to be determined will yield cumulative answers to the same two questions as in Chapter One. The chapter will be divided into two parts according to the two aspects from which the four elements are viewed, the second part leading naturally to the topic of Chapter Three.

Chapter Three: "The Four Elements: De generatione et corruptione"

The same procedure as in Chapter One will be followed. The chapter will not be divided into two parts as in Chapter Two since the elements are grounded on one basis only in this work.

Chapter Four: "The Four Elements: Meteorologica and Summary"

Although the elements are not established in this work, a curtailed treatment of some parts of the Meteorologica will be required to clarify certain points of the theory of four elements. Certain problems arising from conflicts among the views of Aristotelian scholars and commentators and conflicts between these and the author's views will be considered. The chapter will conclude with a summary of the results of Chapters Two to Four.

Chapter Five: "The Relative Logical Status of Aristotle's Theories of the Elements"

Here the comparison of the two theories with regard to the first two questions will be made in such a way as will reveal their relative logical status. Whatever of Aristotle's logical and methodological criteria is necessary to establish the status of the theories will be introduced here.

Conclusion: This final section will present a summary of the results of the above analysis in support of the thesis and remarks made by way of suggestion about the general significance of the conclusion.

Source Responsibility

Primary sources: The dissertation topic is a problem in Aristotle's thought. Consequently, for the most part, attention will be paid to Aristotle's texts alone. To that end various English translations will be used and the Latin and Greek texts will be consulted with regard to difficult passages.

Secondary sources: The commentators (or translators) which will be primarily considered are chosen because of their completeness in the consideration of older, especially Greek, commentators or because of their availability and currency. They are St. Thomas for most parts of all of the works mentioned in the outline; W.D. Ross for the Physics, the notes of J. L. Stocks and W. K.C. Guthrie for the De caelo, and the notes of H. H. Joachim for the De generatione et corruptione. In addition selected studies of Aristotle's physical works extending from the last century and occasional articles will be examined for aid in penetrating Aristotle's meaning and method. These limitations or ones comparable to these are suggested for no other reason than the practical one of remaining within the limitations of a reasonable time.

The preliminary bibliography to be found at the end of the original proposal will give some indication of the kind of literature to be examined in this thesis.

1. Quod omnia quae sunt sunt possibilia esse et non esse
is what the conclusion excludes. See de Caelo I, lect. 26-29.
2. When Aristotle or P.T. disting. space from place, space means either the extension contained by place or imaginary space.
3. On the contrary. It is Newtonian physics which considered space and time as severally as absolutes. In Arist. there is no motion according to place without time, nor time without motion. The only difference: Arist. did not know that to each an absolute one had to recognize the relativity of our particular system of reference; he identified time with what we still use to set our clocks on, namely, the apparent diurnal motion of the fixed stars.
4. No, not generally.
5. (a) Yes. (b) Interesting to learn what is meant by metaph. today. Each of the authors you mention have a point - though a small one, e.g. Murdoch. But the rest of what they have to say ??

Where Sir Julian says that at first sight the biological sector seems full of purpose, we would say that some areas of this sector plainly reveal purpose, though in each and every organism there be ^a great deal that is utterly contrary to what it struggles for. A universal instance of this is death: all organisms die and, as ~~Aristotle~~ Aristotle observed, this ending-of life is hardly a case of "end as that for the sake of which." ~~The fact~~ That automobiles eventually wind up on the junk heap does not mean that their manufacture had no purpose. That eyes are for the sake of seeing is comparable to the way ~~in which we explain that~~ automobiles are for the sake of transportation. While these two instances are by no means identical, they are proportional. The difficulty to understand nature's action for a purpose (in the relatively rare instances where it can be observed) has its analogue in the problem of motion. At first sight there is motion. But when philosophers seek to define what motion is, they are likely to wind up declaring to be either ~~denying~~ it ~~or~~ no more than appearance or ~~asserting~~ that reality itself is no more than appearance--that appearance of reality is all there is.

"Intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it~~x~~ requires experience and time), while moral virtue(which makes men good) comes about as a result of habit... None of the moral virtues arise in us by nature;" for nothing that is mere nature can form a habit that is contrary to it. No matter how many times you throw a stone/^{upwards,}~~up in the air, the stone~~^{it}/will never acquire the habit of going upwards. On the other hand, it is by repeating acts of self-strait that a human being becomes temperate; ~~not by repeating acts~~ by repeated ^{one} ~~repeating~~/self-indulgence ~~that one~~/becomes intemperate.

What manner of person a man will eventually turn out to be is largely predetermined by the kind of training received from the cradle on.

There are three things that make men good and virtuous: nature, habit, and reason. Some philosophers would have us believe that nature really takes care of all; others that nature is arbitrary and that ~~habits are freely chosen~~ we can acquire any habit we choose; finally there are philosophers who would have us believe that a child should train itself by virtue of its own reason. The point is that we acquire habits, good or bad, before we can ~~reason~~ use our own reason; and that our nature is such that it can and does acquire habits; once the habits have been acquired, there is little that reason can do to change them.

The education which the wise men I have quoted bear in mind is that which begins at home, at a time when the child's likes and dislikes differ little from those of any other animal.

the
 In Book III On the Soul Aristotle points out/way our intellect
 knows ~~one contrary by means of the other~~^a/privation by means of its
 opposite, and one contrary by means of the other. Now this appears
 to be common to any knowledge of ~~opposition, whether of contradiction, privation, contrariety, or relation.~~
 For in each ~~of these cases~~ the affirmative term is essential to ~~the~~
~~negation~~ the understanding of the negative one. Even in the opposition
 of relation, that of contradiction is included, ~~for it is in the nature~~^{since it}
 belongs to the very notion of a son "not to be the father of the one of
 whom he is the son." ~~How~~ How, then, are we to understand the knowledge of
~~one opposite by another~~ one opposite by another to
 be characteristic of the kind of mind which is ours? What is typical of
 our mind is that when we ~~know~~^{grasp} the affirmative term, ~~of an opposition~~
 we know its opposite only in potency. Hence, in going from one to the other
 we pass from potency to act--which is already a kind of discourse.

^{supposition}
 But here is the ~~line~~ upon which ~~the~~ our present talk will hinge:
 if there is an intellect which does not attend first to one contrary and then
 to another, it knows itself, and is in act, and separable. In other words,
 it will be its own object primarily, ~~always~~^{forever} in the act of knowing itself,
 and subsist independently of ~~anything else~~. Our first question is:
 how does this corollary follow from the negation of a passage from ~~potency~~
~~to act~~ the act of knowing ~~one opposite to the act of knowing another?~~
 one term to the act of knowing its opposite?

The condition of the human mind is naturally a most difficult one. For, ~~being pure~~ however immaterial in itself, it is the power of an animal. The animal, whether rational or irrational, is a sensible nature. Now, whatever is sensible is intelligible only in potency. Even if our intellectual soul is intelligible in act, it is not so as to us, and ~~we are~~ a man is not his soul. The human intellect, in itself quite immaterial, nonetheless ~~and~~ stands in need of what is material in order to achieve knowledge at all. Even when knowledge is achieved, the actual consideration, no matter how immaterial ~~this may be~~ the known may be, of what we know/still depends upon ~~matter that is in itself~~ become ~~i~~ material reality which in itself cannot possibly/~~be~~ intelligible in act. Without the darkness of the material world, our intellect would not even begin to know. It is because of the innate darkness of our intellect that we depend upon the obscurity of matter to know at all.

It is impossible to imagine a situation more difficult ~~that~~ than the one which natural to the human mind. For, originally, it is utter darkness, nor could it ever come to its own except in a world which in itself is ~~never intelligible except in potential~~ obscure. ~~As~~ Aristotle points out, in Metaphysics II, that "as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the reason in our soul to the things which in themselves are most evident of all." However intelligible in itself, our ~~reason~~ reason is the power of an animal, and the animal, whether ~~rational or irrational~~ man or beast, is a sensible nature ~~which is~~ intelligible only in potency. Yet without the darkness of the material world, our reason would not even begin to know. Because of its innate obscurity, our ~~intellect depends upon the very obscurity of its~~ mind depends upon the ~~obscurity of~~ darkness of material reality to know ~~and to continue in its knowing~~ and persevere in its acts ~~of~~ of knowing. Because of the darkness within us, we stand in need of the darkness without.

It is significant that ~~Aristotle~~ⁱⁿ discussing the way we know
Aristotle
contraries, /should intimate for the first time the nature of an
intellect which is its own primary object.

On the Soul

In Book III ~~Metaphysics~~ Aristotle discusses the way we know
, and with dependence upon,
the negative ~~contrary~~ contrary term after the positive one: when
we know the latter in actuality, we know the other only in potency.
We first know 'good,' ~~then~~ then 'evil;' 'white,' then 'black.'
But what if there were an intellect that does not depend upon
pre-existent knowledge of the positive term to know the negative,
it would know ~~itself~~ itself primarily, ever in act and separable,
i.e. exist ~~independently~~ independent of all matter.¹

1. 430 b 24

We will not try to establish whether Aristotle thus refers to God
or to a subordinate intellectual substance. Whichever the case may
be, it will be that of a thinker who first knows himself, and whatever else
he knows will be ~~known~~ known with dependence upon ~~that self-knowledge~~
most perfectly known.
that primary knowledge of self. Compared to such an intellect, our
intellect
own ~~mind~~ proceeds the other way round.

Observations:

- p. 19, bottom line: because the English word 'meaning' can also stand, in common usage, for 'what is meant,' what the author intends would be clearer if he said "...separation between meaning as a relation and meaning as what is meant, the term of that relation; i.e.

Adam Smith

Abstract from Matter IV

Mc Arthur

(Interpretation of Names)

If the physicist cannot talk to the man outside - and
he himself is such a man - he does not know what
physics has to do with reality. In other words, he
should be able to communicate with himself as a man
outside - ~~most~~^{much} of which he knew of as a child.

blind,
purposeless,

purpose, namely, as Aquinas puts it: "si natura operetur propter finem, necesse est quod ab aliquo intelligente ordinetur." To Sir Julian's mind, however, utterly irrational forces can be made to account for the rise of the only animal that acts for a purpose. "The purpose manifested in evolution, whether in adaptation, specialization, or biological progress, is only an apparent purpose. It is just as much a product of blind forces as is the falling of a stone to earth or the ebb and flow of the tides." A corollary to this view is that we are ~~stuck~~ with all the intellect there is. This is no doubt the way some people want it.

saddled

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meaningless term, which is easy enough for anybody who does not know that it simply means tool or instrument. Anyhow, if there be no purpose in nature, what use can she have for tools? ⁽¹⁾

Charles De Koninck

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

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it before any of it is measured, this construction would be pure fiction, with no reference to reality at all.

Take the definition of animal as 'a body endowed with sensation.' After this definition is reached, are we now able to disregard all acquired knowledge of the definitum?

Y

U

Elsewhere I expressed a difficulty to understand Sir Julian Huxley's position in this matter. Take, for instance, the following statement of his: "Natural selection is an ordering principle. It takes the disorderly material provided by 'random' or 'chance' variation, builds it up into orderly patterns of organisation, and guides it into ordered paths of change." (Man's Place in Nature, in The Destiny of Man, Hodder 1959, p.14.)

As Dr. J.W.C. Wand remarks in the same booklet (p.42): we believe "that 'the mechanism which directs the course of evolution' and its 'ordering principle' are guided by a divine mind to a good and beneficent purpose." Plainly, Sir Julian sees no need for such a mind. Still, whether randomness and chance are the same or not, or whether chance here means pure chance, he does allow, in fact he insists upon, an ordering, guiding, principle; perhaps something analogous to a river bed channeling mountain waters to the sea. But this analogy soon breaks down, for the river bed, too, was somehow formed at random (we would say ex necessitate materiae), and the sea itself is a random distribution. One ought not to ask Sir Julian 'Whence the ordering principle?', for the reply would likely be 'It's just there.' No, we must return to the monkeys pounding at random. Now, when they allegedly produce all extant literature, are their random poundings led to this by an ordering and guiding principle? Will this principle be anything more than the mere possibility of these particular arrangements of letters, which just happen to be meaningful? In virtue of what principle is 'a million monkeys' meaningful, and 'the slithy toves' not? Where is the reason why the former and not the latter arrangement should be 'favourable'?

There is of course a sense in which shoes were possible
before ~~they~~ there were shoemakers. But there is
a further sense in which they became possible
~~only then~~ dependently on maker and material.
The point is that the first possibility is not the
cause of shoes.

Q. 115 : de actiōe corporali creaturae.

Solu de S. Thomas: conferre à tout corps une actiōe
en raison de son acte - celui-ci étant,
comme tel, communément de son.

Q. 116 : de pat

Q. 117 : de his quae pertinent ad actiōem
hominis.

Q. 118 : de traducione hominis ex homine
quod ad animam.

Q. 119 : de propagatiōe hominis quod ad corpus.

Principium

Prolegomena

Conférer à la créature autant de causalité,
de fécondité, que possible.

La créature corporelle et composée:

Quia 1° durient absolt

2° intelligible en puissance slt

Quid materia? dans la ligne du bien?

Appétit naturel, secundum hoc ipsum

quod est. (Phys II fin.) Sens étendu: analog.

La forme est son bien en tant que "quoddam
divinum."

Appétit implique similitudo de l'acte.

Autrement indifférence - comme bois

erga art. donc similitudo de toute

forme dont la matière est capable
comme nature.

Or, adu dans les formes: les unes plus
parfaites que les autres - donc meilleurs;
done matière princip^l appétit de la
forme la plus parfaite: forme rationnelle.

Séparés par 'labor'?

Randomness & determinism
struggle to come to be only by virtue of what
already is

Yet there is a sense in which science
does concern the possible. For instance
In geometry, for instance, it is possible
to construct an equilateral triangle; it is
also possible to prolong its base, showing
that the exterior angle ... This means
that the equilateral triangle 'exists' - in
a sense ~~already~~ ^{already} described, ~~as an entity~~
~~page~~ But in nature, science and
possibility ~~as~~ will ^{again} mean something else.
~~For instance~~ Elephants, for instance,
are manifestly possible. But this possibility
is one of blind-sight; it throws no light
on what ~~the elephants~~ ~~it~~ renders
elephants possible.

To show that ~~the elephants~~ is possible,
one would have to know how he is built and
how such a beast can come to be. But
from such knowledge we cannot infer
that an elephant exists.

Leibniz: that I go to the market
on such a such a day, and that
to be run down by a truck, are
compossible - a sufficient reason
for his death at that time.

There is something to be said for M. G.'s position that the study of philosophy should be put off until an age somewhat greater than ~~that of St. Thomas~~ the one St. Thomas ever reached. This is brought out by the experience of the most eminent physicists of our time. They turn to philosophy when they have long ceased to make significant contributions to their science. Max Born is a good example. His Philosophy of Cause and Chance

Take the demonstrable statement 'There is no last prime

of
Take the notion/^xprime number^x. The 'notion' can be considered

Hic, potentia simul contradictionis.

The immobility here equated ~~with~~ necessity
which

3. Science and the possible

Generally speaking, the word possible has two meanings. One of these is opposed to the impossible, not to the necessary, for what is necessary must be possible, otherwise it could ~~impossibility~~ not possibly be necessary. The other meaning is opposed to/necessary~~x~~, ~~ambiguously~~. This possibility ~~is a simultaneous potency of contradiction.~~¹ ~~It is~~ It is said of things that can be and not be. If Socrates could only lie down, this would mean that there is ~~in~~ for him no possibility to stand. In this respect there would be no potency to contradictories, i.e., ~~it would not be true to say that he can stand.~~ as Socrates is lying down, it would not be true to say that he can stand. 'Socrates is mortal' would not be an instance of this kind of potency, for he shall die. A true instance ~~of~~ would be the mode of his death inasmuch as he may die ~~of poisoning, or~~ poisoned, run down by a truck, or of old age. ^{as in the universe of Laplace,} If everything were predictable/there would be no such thing as potentia simul contradictionis, for this is the very opposite of absolute determinism. And while it is ~~true~~ possible that Socrates die tomorrow, he can at no time be without being an animal. No matter how possible, Socrates cannot ~~escape~~ escape necessity.

For
~~Notwithstanding~~ all the contingency in this world, science remains possible. This does not mean, however, that the necessity of 'Socrates shall die' is the direct subject of scientific knowledge, no more than a given necessary movement would be, except by application, as was already said.

~~if anything is always~~

The potency to be forever is ^x ~~excluded~~ by the kind we are now treating of. For if it were possible to be forever, it would not be possible not to be forever; it cannot be simultaneously true that a thing can be forever and not be forever, for ~~this would~~ this would involve contradiction. This is why we say that in everlasting things there is no difference between ~~possibility~~ and 'to be possible' and 'to be'.

2 3. Science and the possible

What we have just said of necessary movement as excluding possibility requires some clarification. Generally speaking, the word 'possible' has two meanings, one of which is opposed to what is ^{what is} ~~the~~ impossible, the other to ~~the~~ necessary. That the first meaning is not opposed to the necessary is plain from the fact that if ~~these~~ what is necessary were impossible it could not possibly ^{be} ~~be~~ necessary; hence what is necessary must also be possible in the first sense. The other meaning is opposed to what is necessary. By necessary we mean that which cannot not be, and the possibility opposed to this ~~is~~ is described as potentia simul contradictionis, a potency ^{or possibility} to be excluded from the subject of science proper.

This kind of potency is said of things that can be and not be, 'to be' and 'not to be' being contradictories. For instance, if Socrates could only lie down, and never sit or stand, ~~there would~~ ^{false} ~~he~~ ^{he} ~~it would be~~ to say that ~~he~~ can possibly stand, ~~in the second meaning of this term~~ in either sense of the word ~~possible~~ 'possible.' But if he is lying down and ~~can~~ ^{be} ~~thereafter~~ stand up, it will ^{be} false to say that he stands when he is lying down, but true to say that he can stand at the same time that he is lying down. The potency to stand is simultaneous with ^{the} act of lying down. Hence, whatever can only be, is not possible in the ~~second~~ sense of this word.

'Socrates is mortal' would not be a true instance of this kind potency, for, as ~~we shall explain~~ will be explained in a moment, if he lives and ~~is~~ mortal he shall die. A true instance would be the mode of his inescapable death, for he may die at such or such an age, by poison, run down by a truck, or of old age. That Socrates must necessarily die is ^{therefore} / not incompatible with the contingency of the particular reason which may put an end to his life from its very inception. This is a distinction which Leibniz did not see, ^{on the one hand} for he identified the second meaning of possible with

quo primo
factum est; et
ideo quia
lud

ad 10.

Alp.

Pourtant, il venait de ~~parler d'un devenir~~ parler d'un devenir suivant lequel ~~aliquid fieri~~ dicatur aliquid fieri in illo instans, in quantum est terminus prioris temporis in quo fiebat, usurpat sibi hoc quod priori tempore debetur. Et sic non est verum quod hoc quod fit non est; sed quod nunc primo est, et ante hoc non erat; et sic ~~intelligendum~~ est intelligendum quod in his quae fiunt subito, simul est fieri et factum esse." Bref, il y a un instant ultime du temps antérieur, mais c'est le temps

~~ultérieur~~ ultérieur qui "usurpat sibi hoc quod priori tempore debetur".

Nous ne pouvons refaire ici l'exposé de la doctrine ~~aristotélique~~ qu'on peut trouver dans Un paradoxe du devenir par contradict. du livre VIII de la Physique et du commentaire de saint Thomas, / Ce que nous ~~ne~~ venons de dire et de citer devrait suffire ~~pour~~ ^a montrer que je n'affirme rien de contraire à ce le Docteur ~~aristotélique~~ Commun. enseigne en cette matière, _(Ju)

En d'autres termes, dans le cas de la ~~haussant~~ justification

de vin. 48, 4, ad 11

Ce qu'il faut rejeter c'est un "ultimum instans in quo sit panis". De même, "non est accipere ultimum instans in quo culpa fuit, sed ultimum tempus, ut supra dictum ~~est~~ est."2

If the basic terms of philosophy are to be those of common usage,
it seems that the Latin nomen aequivocum will not be properly rendered
by 'equivocal name.' For in English ~~usage~~, equivocal, like ambiguous, carries
Still,
in the main a pejorative meaning. Lord Bertrand Russell has coined the
expression 'systematic ambiguity,' which could be taken to mean much the
such as 'seal,'
same as aequivocum a consilio, as distinguished from a word which happens
to have more than one meaning just by chance. ~~I have also heard~~ The
is now also in use.
expression 'ambiguous by design.'/Although nomen aequivocum a consilio
as
means quite the same as nomen analogum, the latter, ~~as~~ much/the English
unfortunately
'analogous name,' becomes/technical unless explained as a word which
carries more than one meaning, one of which is dependent upon the other.
Yet, I do not feel quite at ease in using 'equivocal' and 'ambiguous'
in a sense that is not pejorative. My only reason for doing so none the
less is the fact that recent attacks upon so-called 'natural language'
because
~~and the expectation that~~ its words can carry several meanings, are implicitly
brought to bear upon analogical terms, which, to our mind, renders most of
philosophy simply impossible--so far as communication is concerned.
The sophist ~~of course~~ too/uses ambiguous terms by design, which merely goes
to show that 'ambiguous by design' is itself ambiguous: it can mean
deliberate
the ~~intentional~~ /exploitation of a term with several meanings for the
purpose of deception. But ~~it is not~~ systematic ambiguity can also mean
~~deliberately~~ deliberately
that as our knowledge progresses we/impose new meanings on words already
in use, ~~and~~ that it is reasonable to do so, that we must be aware of the
and distinct,
extended/meanings of ~~a~~ words in order to express new knowledge and avoid
confusion.

Q. 24: de Praedestinatione Christi

a. 1. Utrum Christo conveniat praedestinatum esse.

Auctoritas Apostoli: "Qui praedestinatus est Filius dei in virtute..."
Rm 1:4

In corpore: quid sit praedestinatio (de qua jam II, 23).

Nota distinctionem inter

- praedestinationem ut dei praedictio ab aeterno
- illud quod cadit sub aeterna praedestinatione.

Hic, ipsa unio hypostatica. Ratione huius
Christus dicitur praedestinatus.

Praedestinatio ~~non~~ dicitur de persona
sive supposito rationali; non autem ad personam
secundum seipsam, sed ratione humanae naturae.

Similiter, esse Filium dei non convenit humanae
naturae. Unde praedestinatio attribuitur personae
Xⁱ, non secundum se, sed secundum quod
subsistit in humana natura. Et hoc factum
est in tempore. Et quamvis haec persona semper
fuerit Filius dei, non tamen semper fuit subsistens
in humana natura. Ideo magis haec est vera: "X est
praedestinatus Filius dei" quam ista "X est factus
Filius dei."

a. 2: Utrum haec sit falsa: "X, secundum quod homo,
est praedestinatus esse Filius dei."

Auctoritas Augustini.

Resp. In praedestinatione duo:

- (a) unum ex parte ipsius praedestinationis aeternae:
~~in quo~~ quod importat quamdam antecessionem
respectu eius quod sub praedestinatione orditur.
- (b) alio modo secundum effectum temporalem, quod
est dei donum gratuitum.

Secundum utrumque attribui praedestinatio Christo
ratione solius humanae naturae. Et quia hoc
dicimus conveniri alicui, secundum quod homo,
secundum quod convenit ei ratione humanae naturae,
sequitur quod Christus secundum quod homo est
praedestinatus esse Filius dei.

Non ratione humanae naturae quoniam haec sit
causa, sed quia susceptione.

[Forsan videatur fin. ad 3^m]

a. 3: Utinam praedestinatio X'i sit notitiae praedestinationis exemplum.
Auctoritas Apostoli in corpore.

Resp. Praedestinatio ista consid.:

(a) secundum ipsum actum praedestinantis. Sic non,
quia uno modo et eodem actu aeterno praedestinavit
Deus nos et Christum.

(b) secundum illud ad quod aliquis praedestinetur,
scil. terminus et effectus. Et sic X' iter:

(i) qnd ad bonum ad quod praedestinemur:

- X' ut esset Filius Dei naturalis

- Nos ad filium adoptionis.

Haec est participata similitudo. Rom. viii.

(ii) qnd ad modum consequendi istud bonum, qd est
per gratiam:

- Qd X' conatus est nullis praeced. meritis,
scil. ut humana natura unita sit Filio Dei

- Nos de plenitudine eius omnes accepimus.

Jo. I, 16.

4. Utrum praed. X i sit causa nostrae praedestinationis.

Auctoritas Apostoli.

Distinguiam ut in art. praec.

- actus: sic non

- terminus: sic ita.

Quia deus ab aeterno praedestinavit nostram salutem, praedestinando, ut per X completeretur.

Sub praedestinatione aeterna... ad 4^{am}.

Ratio, quia & primo membro divisionis praed. intelligi nos et X, praetermittendo modum et ordinem.

Dege ad 3. deus potuit peccatum dimittere absque justificatione. III^a, q. 1, a. 2.

Q. 25: de Adoratione xpi

a. 1. *vd. text.*

a. 2. *Vid. corp.*

a. 3. *Vd. corp. Nota ad tertium, post object.*

a. 4. *Vd corp.*

a. 5. *Vd totum*

dans les notes du cours de philosophie de la nature, été 1963.

P. 6, ligne 9 dans le paragraphe qui commence par "Un jour..."
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Les livres I et II des Physiques.

Ces deux premiers livres forment une introduction générale à l'étude de la nature dans son ensemble. La philosophie de la nature, proprement dite, ne commence qu'au livre III, qui a pour objet la recherche de la définition du mouvement, et de celle de l'infini tels qu'ils se rencontrent dans la nature. Quant au premier livre, il a pour objet de déterminer et de justifier le sujet de l'étude de la nature, considérée tout d'abord dans une généralité qui ne permettra pas de descendre aux cas particuliers si ce n'est suivant ce qu'ils ont en commun.

Tout le premier livre est consacré à ce sujet. C'est que ce sur quoi porte d'abord l'étude de la nature est d'une singulière difficulté. La réalité du monde où nous vivons, toutes les choses qui nous entourent et dont nous sommes, sont soumises au changement. Tout ce qui nous entoure est sous l'un ou l'autre rapport incessamment autre. Héraclite a exprimé cette réalité par deux mots justement célèbres: "pánta reî", c'est-à-dire que toutes choses coulent, s'écoulent, sont à l'état de flux. Cette affirmation appellera certaines distinctions. Reste que, si certaines choses ont une relative stabilité, du moins pendant un certain temps, ne fût-ce que leur identité à travers l'écoulement du temps, tout ce qui vient à l'être dans la nature, depuis les organismes jusqu'aux nébuleuses, finit par périr.

Toute la philosophie grecque a vu dans ce fait du devenir un grand problème. Ce problème, si longtemps oublié après les Grecs, reprit une singulière acuité dans la philosophie de Bergson. L'étude du monde physique avait été dominée, depuis Archimède jusqu'à la fin du dix-neuvième siècle, par le mathématisme. La physique contemporaine, depuis Max Planck, a montré encore une fois que le physique n'est pas entièrement réductible au mathématique. L'application des mathématiques est certainement essentielle à la physique, mais si le physique pouvait être entièrement mathématisé, il faudrait faire totalement abstraction du devenir. Quand on parle de mouvement en mathématique, ce terme de mouvement doit être entendu comme une métaphore.

Le fait du devenir, qui nous frappe le plus dans le mouvement, est attesté par le sens originel du mot d'acte. "Ce nom d'acte, dit Aristote, que nous posons toujours avec celui d'entéléchie, a été étendu des mouvements, d'où il vient principalement, aux autres choses, car on croit généralement, en effet, que l'acte proprement dit, c'est le mouvement. C'est pourquoi on n'attribue pas le mouvement aux choses qui n'existent pas, quoiqu'on leur attribue quelques-uns des autres prédicats: ainsi les choses qui n'existent pas sont intelligibles ou désirables, mais non en mouvement. Il en est ainsi parce que, n'existant pas en acte, elles existeraient en acte si elles étaient en mouvement. En effet, parmi les choses qui ne sont pas, il y en a qui sont en puissance, mais sans être véritablement, parce qu'elles

Quand opp. à δύναμις, δύναμις puissance comme aptitude opposée à ^{action, et entrain} actualité.

ἐνέργεια

ὁμοίως γὰρ
ἡ ἐνέργεια
καὶ ἡ δύναμις
εἶναι

Met. IX, 3,
1047 a 33

Voir "Corrigenda" à la
dernière feuille

C. De Koninck

En marge du livre V des Physiques

Considérations préliminaires.

Ce livre, qui porte d'abord sur les différentes sortes de changements, s'applique aussi à déterminer le sens de certains mots indispensables à l'analyse quantitative du mouvement à laquelle est consacré le livre VI. Avant de donner un bref aperçu des sujets traités dans les livres I à IV inclusivement, je tiens à faire quelques considérations sur le langage philosophique de cette oeuvre. Cela me paraît d'autant plus opportun qu'au chapitre 3 de ce livre V Aristote s'arrête à certains termes fondamentaux, très élémentaires, pour expliquer de quoi nous les disons; par exemple, "ensemble" ou "à la fois", "en contact", "intermédiaire", "consécutif", "contigu", "continu". Comme tout le vocabulaire d'Aristote, ces mots sont empruntés au langage courant de son temps. Ce vocabulaire n'est jamais technique au sens où les mots employés en chimie ou en botanique sont techniques.

1. Quoique la philosophie spéculative soit une activité privée, elle ne peut se passer des artifices du langage, qui est une oeuvre publique. Non seulement le philosophe en a-t-il besoin dans son apprentissage, où il dépend de l'enseignement des hommes aussi bien que des choses, mais encore se parle-t-il intérieurement à lui-même. Les mots ont beau être des moyens de communication faits par la raison pratique, il n'empêche, si paradoxal que cela paraisse, qu'ils sont nécessaires à la vie solitaire du contemplatif. Notre pensée est en effet si confuse à l'origine, elle incline tant à se disperser, qu'il lui faut, pour se porter déterminément sur ceci ou cela, des moyens sensibles et artificiels. C'est ce qu'elle fait quand elle impose aux choses des noms, qu'elle relie par ailleurs entre eux, moyennant les artifices d'une grammaire ou d'une autre et suivant une logique fût-elle rudimentaire. Le besoin d'être nommé ne se trouve pas du côté des choses, mais plutôt dans la nature de notre intelligence qui les connaît. Les bêtes ni les plantes n'ont nul besoin d'être nommées, mais nous autres nous avons grand besoin de leur donner un nom. Celui qui n'éprouverait pas ce besoin serait comme la vache qui, elle, n'a jamais donné de nom à quoi que ce soit.

Cela ne veut point dire que la pensée et le mot soient si indissolublement liés que nous ne puissions connaître la chose indépendamment du nom. Tel mammifère rare auquel nous ne connaîtrions pas de nom spécifique, surgirait devant nous qu'il ne serait désormais plus un pur inconnu. Il reste cependant que nous en chercherions le nom — et qu'on lui en donnerait un s'il n'en avait pas encore.

CORRIGENDA

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